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Carsten Burhop and Nikolaus Wolf
The German Market for Patents during the 
“Second Industrialization,” 1884–1913: 
A Gravity Approach
Using newly collected patent assignment data for late nine-
teenth- and early twentieth-century Germany and a standard 
econometric approach from the international trade literature 
—the gravity model—we demonstrate the existence of border 
effects on a historical technology market. We show that the 
geographic distance between assignor and assignee negatively 
affected the probability of patent assignments, as well as the 
fact that a state or international border separated the two con-
tracting parties. Surprisingly, we show that the effect of a state 
border within Germany was nearly as large as the effect of an 
international border. 
ew production technologies have the power to shift the production-
possibility frontier of an economy outward at a given amount of 
factor inputs. Alternatively, newly invented products enlarge the set of 
goods and services available to consumers. Yet, enlarging the set of avail-
able products or shifting the production possibility frontier outward does 
not imply that production takes place on the frontier. The allocation 
of technology in an economy may be ineffi cient. One way to improve 
the allocation of technology is to generate tradable intellectual property 
rights, e.g., patents. Beyond improving the allocation of technology in 
the economy, trade shifts the production possibility further outward 
since it increases the incentive to innovate. The inventor can simply sell 
the patent to a specialized producer and focus his own efforts on the 
next invention. Consequently, per-capita incomes increase due to the 
better allocation of technology and due to the higher rate of innovation.1 
This argument applies to national as well as to international exchange 
1 Daniel F. Spulber, “Innovation and International Trade in Technology,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 138, no. 1 (2008): 1–20.
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of patents. Therefore, a government that aims at maximizing growth 
should aim at minimizing barriers of trade in technology.
Yet, transfer of technology over space is far from frictionless. At 
least since the seminal work of Adam Jaffe, Manuel Trajtenberg, and 
Rebecca Henderson, it is well known that knowledge spillovers as mea-
sured by patent citations are geographically limited. Moreover, the 
same authors have demonstrated that not only geographic distance, but 
also state borders within the United States inhibit knowledge spillovers.2 
The impact of geographic distance and US state borders on knowledge 
spillovers has been controversially debated. Nonetheless, the existence 
of international barriers to knowledge spillovers is undisputed.3 Similar 
results have been reported for Europe: distance, borders, and linguistic 
barriers as measured by patent citations negatively affect knowledge 
spillovers.4
Historical research has also provided evidence of knowledge spill-
overs and transfers of intellectual property rights. In particular, Naomi 
Lamoreaux and Kenneth Sokoloff demonstrated that about one-third of 
all US patents were assigned during the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries.5 Tom Nicholas has also highlighted patent assignments 
over large geographic distances within the United States.6 In particular, 
individual inventors already supplied a national market with their ideas 
during the early twentieth century.7 Furthermore, Petra Moser demon-
strated that the rise of patenting activity in the chemical industry weak-
ened the localization of innovation substantially.8 Patent assignments 
2 Adam Jaffe, Manuel Trajtenberg, and Rebecca Henderson, “Geographic Localization of 
Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
108, no. 3 (1993): 577–98.
3 Peter Thompson and Melanie Fox-Kean, “Patent Citations and the Geography of Knowl-
edge Spillovers: A Reassessment,” American Economic Review 95, no. 1 (2005): 450–60; 
Rebecca Henderson, Adam Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg, “Patent Citations and the Geogra-
phy of Knowledge Spillovers: A Reassessment: A Comment,” American Economic Review 
95, no. 1 (2005): 461–64; Peter Thompson and Melanie Fox-Kean, “Patent Citations and the 
Geography of Knowledge Spillovers: A Reassessment: A Reply,” American Economic Review 
95, no. 1 (2005): 465–66; Wolfgang Keller, “Geographic Localization of International Tech-
nology Diffusion,” American Economic Review 92, no. 1 (2002): 120–42.
4 Per Botolf Maurseth and Bart Verspagen, “Knowledge Spillovers in Europe: A Patent Ci-
tation Analysis,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 104, no. 4 (2002): 531–45.
5 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Inventors, Firms, and the Market for 
Technology in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries” in Learning by Doing in 
Markets, Firms, and Countries, ed. Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter Te-
min (Chicago, 1999), 19–60; Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Market Trade 
in Patents and the Rise of a Class of Specialized Inventors in the Nineteenth-Century United 
States,” American Economic Review 91, no. 2 (2001): 39–44. 
6 Tom Nicholas, “Spatial Diversity in Invention: Evidence from the Early R&D Labs,” 
Journal of Economic Geography 9, no. 1 (2009): 1–31.
7 Tom Nicholas, “The Role of Independent Invention in US Technological Development, 
1880–1930,” Journal of Economic History 70, no. 1 (2010): 57–82.
8 Petra Moser, “Do Patents Weaken the Localization of Innovations? Evidence from 
World’s Fairs,” Journal of Economic History 71, no. 2 (2011): 363–82.
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in a national patent market also contributed to the performance of the 
Japanese and the British economy during the same period.9 Turning to 
Germany, Jochen Streb, Jörg Baten, and Shuxi Yin showed that patent-
ing activity was highly concentrated and that patenting activity in one 
district positively affected patenting activity in nearby districts. Their 
fi ndings document knowledge spillovers in Germany between the 1870s 
and the 1910s.10 Carsten Burhop has recently provided more direct evi-
dence of patent assignments and thus the transfer of technology. He 
demonstrated that a substantial fraction of the patents granted in Ger-
many between 1877 and 1913 have been assigned.11
In addition, David Gilgen evaluated the international transfer of 
patented technology by looking at aggregate patenting data. His indica-
tor of international technology transfer is the number of patents granted 
to Germans in other countries and the number of patents granted to 
foreigners in Germany. He shows that between the 1890s and World 
War I about one-third of all German patents were granted to foreigners. 
Major sources of imported technology were the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France, and Austria-Hungary. Moreover, Gilgen dem-
onstrates that Germans were active in patenting technology in Britain 
and the United States.12 In contrast to Gilgen, we use patent-level data, 
whereas he is using aggregate national statistics. Moreover, we are also 
investigating patent transfers within Germany, whereas Gilgen is only 
looking at international patenting activity. Finally, we use the patent fees 
paid before a patent transfer as an indicator of patent value, whereas 
Gilgen treats all patents equally. 
We contribute to the debate by combining German patent assign-
ment data collected by Burhop as well as newly collected data from the 
same data source as Burhop’s data with a workhorse model of the inter-
national trade literature, the gravity equation. To our knowledge, this 
is the fi rst attempt to capture technology transfer by patent assign-
ment data in the context of a standard international trade model. In 
9 Tom Nicholas, “Independent Invention during the Rise of the Corporate Economy in 
Britain and Japan,” Economic History Review 64, no. 3 (2011): 995–1023.
10 Jochen Streb, Jörg Baten, and Shuxi Yin, “Technological and Geographical Knowledge 
Spillovers in the German Empire, 1877–1918,” Economic History Review 59, no. 2 (2006): 
347–73.
11 Carsten Burhop, “The Transfer of Patents in Imperial Germany,” Journal of Economic 
History 70, no. 4 (2010): 921–39.
12 David Gilgen, “Die Schaffung eines globalen Marktes für Innovationen—Chancen und 
Grenzen globaler Institutionen, 1880–1914,” in Deutschland als Modell? Rheinischer Kapi-
talismus und Globalisierung seit dem 19. Jahrhundert, ed. David Gilgen, Christopher Kop-
per, and Andreas Leutzsch (Bonn, 2010), 315–59. Gilgen’s work is based on aggregate data 
(i.e., the number of patents granted to Germans in the United States during a certain year), 
whereas we use microdata (i.e., the assignment of a certain patent from a certain fi rm to an-
other fi rm during a certain year). Moreover, Gilgen uses the national state as geographic en-
tity, whereas we geo-code each patent. 
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particular, we want to assess if and to what extent geographical dis-
tance, i ntranational—i.e., borders between German states—and inter-
national borders negatively affect the frequency of patent assignments. 
Such a negative effect of borders is usually reported for trade in goods 
and services.13 In particular, Holger Wolf has reported a negative effect 
for modern intranational trade between US states and Nikolaus Wolf 
reported it for pre-1914 Germany: Not only the external but also Ger-
many’s internal administrative borders restricted the fl ow of goods and 
services.14 However, an investigation using historical patent transfer 
data is—to the best of our knowledge—so far unavailable.
Our key fi nding is a signifi cantly negative effect of both distance 
and borders on patent fl ows. Running a regression with the number of 
patent assignments between city pairs as the dependent variable, we 
fi nd that patents behave very similarly to other commodities. They are 
traded less frequently over long distances and less frequently across state 
and national borders. We thus fi nd evidence that even within Germany 
the market for technology was not fully integrated during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. Moreover, we fi nd that the value of 
patents increases the frequency of their being traded and the probability 
of their being traded over longer distances, similar to evidence in trade 
that more valuable commodities are shipped over longer distances.15 
Once we interact distance with a proxy for patent value, we fi nd that 
distance poses a much lower barrier to transfers to higher-valued pat-
ents than to lower-valued patents, which is a quite intuitive result.
The remaining parts of the article are organized as follows. We start 
with a section providing historical background information. In the next 
section, we describe the data sources and present some descriptive sta-
tistics. We then outline the econometric approach, present the estima-
tion results, and fi nally conclude the article. 
Historical Background
From the 1870s onward, the incorporation of science into industrial 
production and the industrialization of scientifi c research characterized 
13 James E. Anderson and Eric van Wincoop, “Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the 
Border Puzzle,” American Economic Review 93, no. 1 (2003): 170–92, is the seminal article 
in the fi eld of international trade in goods and services. They show that international borders 
reduce trade by 20 to 50 percent. 
14 Holger C. Wolf, “Intranational Home Bias in Trade,” Review of Economics and Statis-
tics 82, no. 4 (2000): 555–63; Nikolaus Wolf, “Was Germany Ever United? Evidence from 
Intra- and International Trade, 1885–1933,” Journal of Economic History 69, no. 3 (2009): 
846–81.
15 David Hummels and Alexandre Skiba, “Shipping the Good Apples Out? An Empirical 
Confi rmation of the Alchian-Allen Conjecture,” Journal of Political Economy 112, no. 6 
(2004): 1384–1402.
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the German innovation system. In particular, fi rms from the chemical 
and pharmaceutical industries made increasing use of the growing res-
ervoir of scientifi cally trained chemists—either by employing them for 
in-house research or by cooperating with them.16 Apart from heavy in-
vestment in universities and other research facilities, an important po-
litical contribution was the enactment of the fi rst unifi ed German pat-
ent law in 1877. In the preceding years, there existed a patchwork of 
numerous patent legislations in the individual German states, and in 
many cases the state authorities regarded patents as privileges rather 
than as rights.17 As a result of the enactment of the patent law, inven-
tions covered by the law became a nationwide tradable good. 
Case studies of innovation procurement suggest a signifi cant fl ow 
from outside inventions into new products.18 However, only some evi-
dence exists from studies that focus on either the research activities or 
the general history of specifi c companies. In his study on the synthetic-
dye-research programs of BASF and Hoechst, Carsten Reinhardt gives 
a detailed account of the companies’ cooperation with individual re-
searchers.19 In addition, he mentions technology-transfer agreements 
that these companies signed with other companies. For the pharmaceu-
tical research activities of Bayer, Hoechst, and Merck, Wolfgang Wim-
mer provides some information about these companies’ exchanges of 
technology with individual researchers and with other fi rms.20 Similar 
information about technology transfer with companies and the cooper-
ation with individual researchers is available in Werner Abelshauser’s 
monograph on the corporate history of BASF, Burhop’s article on Merck, 
Reinhardt’s work on pharmaceutical research at BASF, and Reinhardt 
and Travis’s study on Heinrich Caro, BASF’s head of research during the 
16 There are numerous studies on the linkage between the state, universities, and the 
chemical industry. See, e.g., Peter Borscheid, Naturwissenschaft, Staat und Industrie in 
Baden, 1848–1914 (Stuttgart, 1976); Johann Peter Murmann, Knowledge and Competitive 
Advantage: The Coevolution of Firms, Technology, and National Institutions (Cambridge, 
UK, 2003); Walter Wetzel, Naturwissenschaften und chemische Industrie in Deutschland: 
Voraussetzungen und Mechanismen ihres Aufstiegs im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1991).
17 For the history of the patent laws of different German territories, see Alfred Heggen, 
Erfi ndungsschutz und Industrialisierung in Preußen, 1793–1877 (Göttingen, 1975); Margrit 
Seckelmann, Industrialisierung, Internationalisierung und Patentrecht im Deutschen Reich, 
1871–1914 (Frankfurt am Main, 2006), 57–106. The long lasting and complex negotiation 
process that preceded the enactment of the patent law in 1877 is documented in Arndt 
Fleischer, Patentgesetzgebung und chemisch-pharmazeutische Industrie im Deutschen Kai-
serreich, 1871–1918 (Stuttgart, 1984).
18 Wolfgang Wimmer, “Wir haben fast immer was Neues”: Gesundheitswesen und Inno-
vationen in der Pharma-Industrie in Deutschland, 1880–1935 (Berlin, 1994); Carsten 
Burhop, “Pharmaceutical Research in Wilhelmine Germany: The Case of E. Merck,” Business 
History Review 83 (Autumn 2009): 475–503.
19 Carsten Reinhardt, Forschung in der chemischen Industrie: Die Entwicklung syntheti-
scher Farbstoffe bei BASF und Hoechst, 1863–1914 (Freiberg, 1997).
20 Wimmer, “Wir haben fast immer was Neues.”
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late nineteenth century.21 Furthermore, Manfred Pohl, Peter Strunk, 
Wilfried Feldenkirchen, and—last but not least—Sigfrid von Weiher and 
Herbert Goetzler mention that fi rms from the fi eld of electrical engi-
neering were also involved in the transfer of technology.22 Thus, busi-
ness historians have already investigated some aspects of technology 
procurement. 
Our article goes beyond the state of the art in two dimensions. First, 
we are not focusing on individual fi rms, great inventors, or important 
inventions, but on systematic evidence about the transfer of technol-
ogy. Second, we incorporate geographic distance as an important ex-
planatory variable with respect to the transfer of technology embodied 
in patents. Yet, our approach is limited with respect to the type of tech-
nology and to the legal type of transfer we are looking at. More specifi -
cally, we only investigate the transfer of technology codifi ed in patents, 
and we are only evaluating the complete transfer of a patent (i.e., buy-
ing and selling a patent), whereas we do not cover other types of legal 
transfers, especially licensing agreements. This focus implies that the 
patent law—specifying the property right to be traded—and the civil law 
—governing the buy-and-sell contract—build the legal backbone of our 
article. 
In 1877, the fi rst federal patent law in Germany replaced a patch-
work of state-specifi c legislations. Subsequently, inventors had to learn 
the principles of the new patent law since it was an entirely new law and 
not the extension of one state law (e.g., the Prussian patent legislation) 
to the other German states. Moreover, the learning base of inventors 
varied with their place of residence; for example, until 1877 some states 
had a technical examination of patent applications (e.g., Prussia), whereas 
other states granted a patent without technical examination (e.g., Ba-
varia). Furthermore, some states (e.g., Hamburg and Bremen) had no 
patent law at all. Such state-wise differences in the pre-1877 period may 
imply border effects that slowly disappeared after 1877. 
The new German patent law specifi ed at fi rst the qualities of a pat-
ent. In particular, according to §1 of the patent law (PatG), a patent can 
be granted for a new invention if the invention is of potential economic 
21 Werner Abelshauser, ed., Die BASF: Eine Unternehmensgeschichte (Munich, 2002); 
Burhop, “Pharmaceutical Research in Wilhelmine Germany”; Reinhardt, Forschung in der 
chemischen Industrie; Carsten Reinhardt and A. S. Travis, Heinrich Caro and the Creation 
of the Modern Chemical Industry (Dordrecht, 2000).
22 Manfred Pohl, Emil Rathenau und die AEG (Berlin, 1988); Wilfried Feldenkirchen, 
Siemens: Von der Werkstatt zum Weltunternehmen (Munich, 2003); Peter Strunk, Die AEG: 
Aufstieg und Niedergang einer Industrielegende, 2d ed. (Berlin, 2000); Sigfrid von Weiher 
and Herbert Goetzler, “Weg und Wirken der Siemens-Werke im Fortschritt der Elektrotech-
nik, 1847–1980: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Elektroindustrie,” Zeitschrift für Unterneh-
mensgeschichte, Beiheft 21 (Stuttgart, 1981). 
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use. Thus, German patents can be considered as commodities. Food, 
drugs, and chemical products could not be patented, but the patent law 
covered the processes employed.23 The patent covered the German ter-
ritory, i.e., the patent holder had the exclusive right to use the pat-
ented technology in Germany. In addition, the policy interdicted im-
porting patent-protected products from other countries by third parties 
(§4 PatG). Thus, the economic value of a German patent depended on
the size of the market for the protected product or process within Ger-
many. Since the German economy grew over time, the market potential
for a patent holder increased, too. Assuming constant transaction costs,
growing market size should lead to growing transfer activity over time.
Furthermore, a growing market for patents may lead to the emergence
of specialized intermediaries—e.g., patent lawyers—inducing declining
transaction costs and increasing market size. We therefore expect a
growing transfer activity over time.
Transaction costs included the legal and administrative costs. The 
patent offi ce can register patent assignments and has to register changes 
in ownership if it gets knowledge about such a change. No fee was raised 
for such a registration. However, the buyer and the seller of a patent 
had to provide a legal certifi cate from the local court or from a Notar.24 
However, there was no legal obligation on the part of buyers or sellers 
to inform the patent offi ce. Yet, all patent rights belonged to the person 
registered at the patent offi ce.25 This policy implies that the registered 
patent owner has the exclusive right to use the patent—a strong incen-
tive to register the assignment at the patent offi ce.
The patent law did not regulate the legal act governing the transfer 
of a patent. This omission is quite important to mention, since the con-
tract law governing buying and selling of a patent had been a state law 
until nationwide legislation came into force in January 1900 (Bürger-
liches Gesetzbuch, BGB).26 At least from 1900 onward, the seller of a 
patent had additional duties, which the contract did not necessarily de-
fi ne well (Treu und Glauben).27 For example, the patent seller not only 
23 §1 PatG “Patente werden erteilt für neue Erfi ndungen, welche eine gewerbliche Verwer-
tung gestatten. Ausgenommen sind: 1. Erfi ndungen, deren Verwertung den Gesetzen oder 
guten Sitten zuwiderlaufen würde; 2. Erfi ndungen von Nahrungs-, Genuß- und Arzneimit-
teln, sowie von Stoffen, welche auf chemischem Weg hergestellt werden, soweit die Erfi ndun-
gen nicht ein bestimmtes Verfahren zur Herstellung der Gegenstände betreffen.”
24 Felix Damme, Das deutsche Patentrecht (Berlin, 1906), 92.
25 §19 (2) PatG “Tritt in der Person des Patentinhabers oder seines Vertreters eine Ände-
rung ein, so wird dieselbe, wenn sie in beweisender Form zur Kenntnis des Patentamtes 
g ebracht ist, ebenfalls in der Rolle vermerkt und durch den Reichsanzeiger veröffentlicht. 
S olange dies nicht geschehen ist, bleiben der frühere Patentinhaber und sein früherer Vertreter 
nach Maßgabe dieses Gesetzes berechtigt und verpfl ichtet.”
26 Damme, Patentrecht, 387.
27 Josef Kohler, Handbuch des deutschen Patentrechts in rechtsvergleichender Darstel-
lung (Mannheim, 1900), 581–82.
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had to provide the patent but also all information necessary to actually 
use the patent. Such an extensive duty to inform may imply personal con-
tact of buyer and seller, leading to distance-dependent transaction costs. 
In addition, while the property right (the patent) was defi ned iden-
tically all over Germany since 1877, the contract law governing the 
transfer of rights varied from state to state until 1900. Moreover, the 
contract law in force in the German states during the pre-1900 period 
was quite heterogeneous. For example, most parts of Prussia and Ba-
varia had a contract law based on traditional German and Roman legal 
systems (Preußisches Allgemeines Landrecht since 1794, Codex Maxi-
milianeus Bavaricus Civilis since 1751), whereas other German territo-
ries (Baden, Württemberg, Elsass-Lothringen) used a French-style civil 
code from the Napoleonic era. Furthermore, the unifi ed civil law en-
acted in 1900 was an entirely new law, and it was not based on any for-
mer state law. Consequently, we can expect state-border effects during 
the pre-1900 period, and we may fi nd slowly disappearing border ef-
fects from 1900 onward.
With respect to international patent transfers—which Gilgen re-
cently considered—one should keep in mind that foreigners had the 
same rights as Germans, but foreigners had to appoint a representative 
residing in Germany, usually a patent lawyer, to act for the foreign in-
ventor (§12 PatG). In addition, German was the only language accepted 
by the patent offi ce (§33 PatG). Both regulations increased the transac-
tion costs for foreigners, and thus we expect a border effect between 
Germany and other countries. An international border effect may also 
result from the fact that the German patent law differed in some respect 
from other countries’ legislation. 
Four features distinguish the German patent law from the laws in 
the United States or the United Kingdom. First, in Germany, a patent 
was granted to the person registering it at the patent offi ce, not to the 
actual inventor. Consequently, inventions made by employed inventors 
were typically granted to the fi rms they worked for. This policy makes 
assignments at issue much less frequent in Germany compared to the 
United States.28 Second, the patent offi ce made a detailed technical ex-
amination of the invention, and usually settled questions of patent in-
fringements in the period between publication of the patent application 
and the granting of the patent.29 Between 1877 and 1913, about 60 per-
cent of the patent applications did not pass the technical examination 
28 Carsten Burhop and Thorsten Lübbers, “Incentives and Innovation? R&D Management 
in Germany’s Chemical and Electrical Engineering Industries around 1900,” Explorations in 
Economic History 47, no. 1 (2010): 100–11.
29 Margrit Seckelmann, Industrialisierung, Internationalisierung und Patentrecht im 
Deutschen Reich, 1871–1914 (Frankfurt am Main, 2006), 257–60.
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by the patent offi ce. In addition, 1.5 percent of the published patent ap-
plications were appealed and not granted. Once the patent was granted, 
it represented a very secure intellectual property right. The patent offi ce 
repealed only 0.3 percent of the patents. Moreover, the number of pat-
ent infringements was extremely low, and only a few dozen cases were 
brought to the patent court each year.30 Third, since it was compulsory 
to put the patent into use within three years after it had been issued, in-
dependent inventors had a strong incentive to assign their patents to 
fi rms when they lacked resources to comply within three years. Fourth, 
the patentee had to pay an annual fee to keep the patent active. This fee 
was 50 marks for the fi rst year and 50 marks for the second year of 
protection, but thereafter the fee increased substantially by 50 marks 
per year up to the maximum annual fee of 700 marks for the fi fteenth 
and fi nal year of protection. Therefore, the cumulated fee over the 
maximum period of patent protection of fi fteen years was 5,300 marks 
(ca. $1,260), about 6.5 times the annual per capita income in 1913.31
The differences between the German patent law and foreign patent 
laws made the assessment of the potential value of a German patent 
more diffi cult for foreigners. Thus, differences in patent legislation can 
result in a border effect. However, foreigners may learn the specifi c reg-
ulations of the German patent law, and we may expect a declining inter-
national border effect over time. 
Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
The data we use in this article have been collected from the annual 
patent register (Verzeichnis der vom Kaiserlichen Patentamt im Jahre 
[. . . ] erteilten und noch in Wirkung stehenden Patente). More specifi -
cally, Section 5 of the patent yearbook contains a register of all patents 
that were still in force during a certain year and for which the patent of-
fi ce registered a change in ownership.
For example, the patent number 92,717 was transferred in 1900 to 
Firma Karl Ernst Maaz in Langburkersdorf, a small village in Saxony. 
Using the patent number, we can identify the original patent holder—
either by using the annual patent register or by using the online archive 
30 Burhop, “The Transfer of Patents in Imperial Germany,” 927. The importance of secure 
property rights for the emergence of a patent market in the United States has been high-
lighted by B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “ ‘Schemes of Practical Utility’: Entrepre-
neurship and Innovation among ‘Great Inventors’ in the United States, 1790–1865,” Journal 
of Economic History 53, no. 2 (1993): 289–307; and by B. Zorina Khan, “Property Rights 
and Patent Litigation in Early Nineteenth-Century America,” Journal of Economic History 
55, no. 1 (1995): 58–97.
31 Burhop, “The Transfer of Patents in Imperial Germany,” 927–28.
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of the German patent offi ce. The patent was granted on 3 June 1896 to 
Karl Wiessner, living in Dresden, the capital of Saxony, about 37 kilo-
meters west of Langburkersdorf. In addition, we know from these two 
pieces of information that until the transfer Wiessner paid at least the 
patent fees for 1896 (50 marks), 1897 (50 marks), 1898 (100 marks), 
and 1899 (150 marks)—in total 350 marks. We take this amount as the 
(minimum) patent value. 
The fi rst set of assignment data was published in 1884. Thereafter, 
annual data until 1913 are—in principle—available.32 For a sample of 
patents, relevant data have already been registered. In particular, the 
patent number, the technology class, the name and place of residence of 
the original patent holder, the year the patent was issued and the year 
the patent was assigned. The data contain only a subsample of observa-
tion information about the name and place of residence of the new pat-
ent holder. We collected the missing information. In addition we coded 
the old and the new patent owner to be an individual or a fi rm, and we 
constructed dummy variables indicating if the patent transfer was re-
lated to a change in the legal form of the patent holder (i.e., an inheri-
tance or the change of the legal type of enterprise).33 Furthermore, 
using the information about the place of residence of the old and the 
new owner of a patent, we calculated the distance (in kilometers) be-
tween them, and we constructed dummy variables if the patent crosses 
an intranational or international border in the course of assignment.
While the data contain a lot of information, a few drawbacks should 
be kept in mind.34 First, the transfer register did not list patent assign-
ments agreed upon between the issue of the patent and the publication 
of the next patent yearbook (usually in March of the following year). 
This point could be important if assignments at issue were important. 
Indeed, assignments at issue were important in the United States, since 
inventions of employed inventors were fi rst granted to the inventor and 
then assigned to the fi rm employing him. This type of assignment was 
most likely unimportant in Germany since the employer registered the 
patent. Second, some assignments were done for legal reasons. The pat-
ent offi ce regularly assigned patents if the legal form of the fi rm holding 
the patent changed. Furthermore, the patent offi ce registered transfers 
from an individual to another individual as an inheritance. The latter 
two types of transfers do not relate to technology market transactions, 
and we excluded them from our dataset. Third, the economic value of 
patents varies substantially, but it is usually unobservable. Standard 
32 The patent offi ce did not publish the data for 1888. 
33 See Burhop, “The Transfer of Patents in Imperial Germany,” 930–32 for more details. 
34 See ibid., 928–30, on this point. 
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proxies for the value of patents are the number of years a patent is in 
force, the patent fees paid, and the number of citations received.35 Cita-
tions are unavailable for German patents from the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. In contrast, the number of years a patent was 
in force and the fees paid is observable. Our preferred proxy for the 
lower bound of the patent value is the fee paid before the transfer, since 
this is an obvious lower bound for the price demanded by the assignor. 
Fourth, the transfer data are censored since the patent offi ce stopped 
the publication of those data in 1914. In practice, about 80 percent of all 
assignments were accomplished during the fi rst four years after issue. 
Therefore, censoring may be problematic for patents issued after 1909.36 
To address this problem econometrically, we controlled for the year of 
issue and also clustered standard errors around the year of issue in our 
statistical model. Fifth, we looked only at realized transfers, not at all 
possible transfers; i.e., we ignored the zeros of non-assigned patents. 
Thus, we investigated trade data conditioned on the fact that there is 
trade at all.37 By implication, all of our estimates on trade costs need to 
be interpreted as lower bounds.
Our database contains 13,559 patent assignments for the period 
1884 to 1913. Table 1 shows some key descriptive statistics. About two-
thirds of all patent assignments refer to activities within one German 
state; i.e., neither a national nor an international border was crossed. 
Around 23 percent of all assignments were agreed upon between two 
parties residing in different German states. More than 10 percent of all 
transfers involved a contracting party residing outside Germany. On 
average, the patent was assigned about 2.7 years after the year of issue, 
and they transcended about 428 kilometers (about 265 miles). Splitting 
the sample into two subsamples—the fi rst running from 1884 until 
1899, the second running from the unifi cation of private law in 1900 
until 1913—demonstrates that the key characteristics of patents remain 
very similar. Splitting the sample with respect to another dimension—
namely if a border was crossed or not—yields two important insights: 
Patents assigned across intranational or international borders tend to 
be more valuable and they tend to be assigned over a longer distance.
35 Zvi Griliches, “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature 28, no. 4 (1990): 1661–1707; Hariolf Grupp, Iciar Dominguez-Lacasa, and 
Monika Friedrich-Nishio, Das deutsche Innovationssystem seit der Reichsgründung (Hei-
delberg, 2002); Rainer Metz and Oliver Watteler, “Historische Innovationsindikatoren: 
Ergebnisse einer Pilotstudie,” Historical Social Research 27, no. 1 (2002): 4–129. 
36 Censoring could be a problem for all patents issued after 1899 since the maximum life-
time of a patent was fi fteen years. 
37 This problem has been highlighted, for example, by Elhanan Helpman, Marc Melitz, 
and Yona Rubinstein, “Estimating Trade Flows: Trading Partners and Trading Volumes,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, no. 2 (2008): 441–87.
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Information included in Table 2 illustrates some differences among 
the ten most active fi elds of technology transfer. It turns out that the 
mean age of patents at the time of assignment did not vary much. Only 
between 2.4 and 3.2 years passed between issue and assignment of a 
patent. More variance among technology fi elds can be observed with re-
spect to the distance or the borders transcended. On the one hand, 
some technologies were fairly local. About 92 percent of all patent as-
signments in the fi eld of civil engineering and construction were within 
one state, and the mean distance between assignor and assignee was 
only 102 kilometers. A similar picture can be observed with respect to 
patents covering domestic appliances. Eighty-fi ve percent of assign-
ments were within the border of one German state, and the mean dis-
tance between assignor and assignee was less than 100 kilometers. On 
the other hand, some types of technology were traded on a national or 
even international market. For example, about one-third of all patent 
assignments in the area of printing machines and typewriters were 





Number of patent assignments 13,559 3,411 10,148
Assignment within German 
state (%)   66.5  66.7   66.4 
Assignment across German 
state border (%)   23.1  21.4   23.7 
International assignment (%)   10.4  11.8    9.9 
Mean age of assigned patent in 
years    2.7   2.9    2.5
Mean distance between assignor 
and assignee in kilometers  428   386  442







Number of patent assignments  9,013 3,135  1,411
Mean age of assigned patent 
in years    2.6   2.9    3.2
Mean distance between assignor 
and assignee in kilometers  97   807  1,934
Source: Authors’ calculations using patent assignment database.
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across German states’ borders. Consequently, the mean distance tran-
scended by patents from this technology class was fairly large.
Beyond descriptive statistics over the whole sample period, Figure 
1 shows the evolution of three key variables between 1889 and 1913. It 
turns out that the mean amount of fees paid by a patent holder before a 
transfer was quite stable over time. The average fees paid before the 
transfer fl uctuated around 350 marks. Moreover, the mean distance be-
tween buyer and seller of a patent was also quite stable over time, fl uc-
tuating around 400 kilometers. Furthermore, the number of transferred 
patents included in our database increased over time, from about 320 
per year around 1890 to about 420 per year around 1910. 
Finally, we would like to point out that patent assignments within 
cities were quite important. There were 6,665 out of 13,559 patent as-
signments that concerned activities with the assignor and assignee re-
siding in the same city. In particular, assignments within Berlin account 
for a large number of observations. To account for this fact, we included 
a Berlin dummy variable in our econometric approach.38 
Table 2




















Electrical engineering 364 2.7 17.8 18.6 63.6 
Domestic appliances  97 2.4  5.5  9.2 85.3 
Mechanical metal 
 processing 458 3.2 19.0 23.8 57.2 
Chemistry 208 2.7  9.8 15.3 74.9 
Mechanical and optical 
 instruments 772 2.5 17.0 20.8 62.2 
Printing machines and 
 typewriters 898 3.2 33.3 34.0 32.7 
Machine parts 333 2.4 14.9 16.4 68.7 
Railway technology 310 2.4 14.5 16.9 68.6 
Pharmaceuticals 151 2.4 14.5 16.1 69.4
Civil engineering & 
construction 102 3.0  3.5  4.4 92.1 
Source: Patent assignment database; authors’ calculations.
38 We do not use the name of assignors or assignees as an important descriptive cate-
gory since our research focuses on the geographic dimension of patent assignments, not on 
the organization of innovations in fi rms and industries. In contrast to recent fi ndings from 
business history, the patent market was not highly concentrated. The average person or fi rm 
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Econometric Method: The Gravity Equation
We interpret patent assignments as trade in innovations and esti-
mate the effect of frictions (distance and borders) on this trade within 
the framework of a gravity equation. Let us start at a most general level. 
We defi ne the (empirical) “gravity equation” as a relationship where the 
predicted volume of an economic interaction between two locations, i 
and j (regions, cities), is a function of unilateral factors specifi c to either 
location i or j, and bilateral frictions τij between them. Relevant unilat-
eral or location-specifi c factors can be the local population, number of 
fi rms, or some other measure of local economic activity. As James E. 
Anderson discussed, empirical research has found that such a gravity 
equation fi ts a wide range of economic interactions very well.39 Apart 
from the well-known applications to trade data, the gravity equation 
has also been found to describe well migration fl ows, foreign direct 
included in our dataset sold 1.4 patents and acquired 1.6 patents. The fi ve most important 
fi rms contributed only 4 percent of all trading activity. The most active fi rms on the patent 
markets were fi rms from the electrical-engineering industry, whereas the most active inven-
tors were the large fi rms from the dyestuff and chemical industries. See Harald Degener, 
“Schumpeterian German Firms before and after World War I: The Innovative Few and the 
Non-Innovative Many,” Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte 54, no. 1 (2009): 50–72.
39 James E. Anderson, “The Gravity Model,” Annual Review of Economics 3, no. 1 (2011): 
133–60.
Figure 1. Time series of patent transfers and of patent characteristics. (Source: Patent trans-
fer database, authors’ calculations.)
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i nvestment, more broadly defi ned capital fl ows, and, notably, geograph-
ical patterns of technology diffusion.40 After a surge in empirical stud-
ies, the more recent literature has focused on theoretical foundations 
for these fi ndings.
In summary, model economies will generate a “gravity equation” 
under three conditions: fi rst, depending on supply and/or demand 
conditions, locations specialize in certain activities; second, demand 
for interaction between locations can be described by a CES or related 
system; third, the bilateral frictions between locations increase with 
geographical distance (for example, in the form of iceberg transport 
costs).41 It has been shown that a host of different models fulfi ll these 
conditions and thus can generate gravity equations. Given that the focus 
of our article is empirical, it is therefore suffi cient to discuss whether 
these three conditions are plausible for the market of patent assign-
ments in Germany prior to 1914.
The fi rst two conditions imply that there is a wide range of differen-
tiated goods—in our case specifi c patents—in the economy, which in 
equilibrium are exchanged between a wide range of locations. Streb, 
Baten, and Yin show that patenting activities were geographically con-
centrated, but that concentration was far from complete.42 They also 
illustrate that regions did specialize in certain industries and notably 
that clusters of (internally even more specialized) fi rms characterized 
locations. While Berlin had a large share in nearly every kind of pat-
enting industry, the Rhine region dominated the chemical industries, 
and Saxony was particularly strong in mechanical engineering and tex-
tiles. Note that depending on the characteristics of locations and the 
level of bilateral frictions, many possible interactions between locations 
can be inactive in gravity models. We observe in our data a lot of patent 
40 Scott L. Baier and Jeffrey H. Bergstrand, “The Growth of World Trade: Tariffs, Trans-
port Costs, and Income Similarity,” Journal of International Economics 53, no. 1 (2001): 1–
27; Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum, “Technology, Geography, and Trade,” Economet-
rica 70, no. 5 (2002): 1741–79; Anderson and van Wincoop, “Gravity with Gravitas,” 170–92; 
Jeffrey Grogger and Gordon H. Hanson, “Income Maximization and the Selection and Sort-
ing of International Migration,” Journal of Development Economics 95, no. 1 (2011): 42–57; 
Keith Head and John Ries, “FDI as an Outcome of the Market for Corporate Control: Theory 
and Evidence,” Journal of International Economics 74, no. 1 (2008): 2–20; Swati Gosh and 
Holger C. Wolf, “Is There a Curse of Location? Spatial Determinants of Capital Flows to 
Emerging Markets,” in Capital Flows and the Emerging Economies: Theory, Evidence, and 
Controversies, ed. Sebastian Edwards (Chicago, 2000), 137–58; Wolfgang Keller, “Geo-
graphic Localization of International Technology Diffusion,” American Economic Review 
92, no. 1 (2002): 120–42.
41 Alan V. Deardorff, “Local Comparative Advantage: Trade Costs and the Pattern of 
Trade,” University of Michigan Research Seminar in International Economics Working Pa-
per no. 500 (2004).
42 Streb, Baten, and Yin, “Technological and Geographical Knowledge Spillovers in the 
German Empire.” 
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assignments between fi rms within Berlin, but also within and between 
many other locations. In total we have 2,620 unique pairs in our sam-
ple, of which 43 percent trade more than once and 27 percent more 
than three times during the sample period. Moreover, a CES-demand 
system implies that patents are incomplete substitutes, that there will 
be a positive demand for every produced variety at all locations (condi-
tional on the level of frictions), and that demand-shifters (like income 
shocks) do not affect the composition of patent assignments. For exam-
ple, a region specialized in textile products will not systematically in-
crease its demand for dyestuff patents in response to an income shock. 
This fact makes sense if, for example, regional specialization is largely 
determined by supply side factors such as the location of resources or 
internal economies of scale. The fi rst two conditions for a gravity equa-
tion are therefore plausible in our context. The third condition requires 
that frictions between locations increase in geographical distance, or 
put differently, that proximity makes interactions less costly and there-
fore more frequent.
Knowledge, as an intangible, seems to be much less affected by spa-
tial frictions than other goods. But there is evidence for substantial 
costs of transferring knowledge between locations. While the codifi ca-
tion of knowledge in the form of patents eases their transfer over dis-
tance, several factors stand against this. First, patent assignments are 
directly related to innovative activities, which in turn tend to be geo-
graphically clustered with spatially limited spillovers and input-output 
linkages. This relationship has two effects on the geography of patent 
assignments. On one hand, fi rms will tend to buy patents from neigh-
boring fi rms because they tend to be of a related industry. On the other, 
even with patents the codifi cation of knowledge is hardly ever complete 
and fi rms will be better equipped to use other fi rms’ patents if they op-
erate in a similar industry or have access to experts nearby. Second, 
patent assignments may be related to trade in intermediary inputs, such 
as machinery or parts thereof or service personnel to install or repair 
machinery. To the extent that the costs of these activities increase with 
distance, distance affects patent assignments. 
In our approach, we want to extend the standard formulation of bi-
lateral frictions in two ways. First, we want to allow for the possibility 
that the characteristics of goods (patents), notably their value, affect the 
probability of trade. The iceberg formulation implies that frictions are 
proportional to the value of traded goods. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that more valuable goods, or patents for that matter, can over-
come frictions more easily than other goods. The simplest way to allow 
for this assumption is to add a fi xed-cost component to the formulation 
of frictions, which is independent of the characteristics of goods. With 
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this, the effect of frictions will decline with a higher value of goods (the 
Alchian-Allen effect). Next, we expect that non-distance-related trade 
costs arising along administrative borders affect patent assignments. 
Legal costs to apply for a patent or to assign it are likely to increase with 
differences in legal systems, often exacerbated by language differences 
as discussed in the section on historical background. So we extend our 
formulation of bilateral frictions to allow for this possibility.
On this background, it is useful to follow the approach put forward 
by James E. Anderson and Eric van Wincoop for the estimation of a 
gravity equation on commodity trade.43 At any point in time, the fre-
quency of patent assignments X from region or city i to region or city j 
can be explained by the relative economic size of the place of residency 
of the assignor and assignee, expressed here as the proportion of the 
product of the assignors economic activity Y and the assignees activity 
E in overall economic activity. Additionally, assignments depend on the 
bilateral resistance to trade patents (denoted by t, which is one plus the 
“tariff equivalent” of trade barriers) relative to the overall barriers to 
trade of the respective trading partners (i.e., the inward “multilateral 
resistance” P and the outward “multilateral resistance” Π). The elastic-
ity of substitution between product or patent varieties from different 
exporters i is denoted by σ. The gravity model (ignoring the time index) 









Most of the variables in (1) are not directly observable to us. However, 
all these variables except the bilateral barriers to trade are region- or 
city-specifi c, but not pair-specifi c. As a result, it is still possible to con-
sistently estimate the average effect of trade barriers in (1) by introduc-
ing two sets of time-varying dummy variables. These sets of dummy 
variables, denoted Aki,t and A
k
i,t, are specifi c to each region. They take the
value of one whenever a region enters the equation as an exporter or 
importer, respectively.
To identify trade barriers we need to make some assumptions about 
their structure. Here we will assume that trade in patents, i.e., the fre-
quency of patent assignments between locations, declines with geo-
graphical distance (e.g., due to factors correlated with distance such as 
knowledge spillovers or similarity in specialization patterns) and with 
administrative borders (e.g., due to red tape, taxes, etc.) in the follow-
ing form (dropping again the time index):
t
ij




43 Anderson and van Wincoop, “Gravity.”
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where fc stands for a fi xed cost associated with each patent assignment, 
dist is the geographical distance between two locations, and border is a 
dummy variable equal to one whenever an administrative border is 
crossed and zero else. With this functional form, estimates of γ1 and γ2 
have a straightforward interpretation. Given distance and the elasticity 
of substitution σ, we can calculate the percentage decrease of the fre-
quency of patent assignments implied by crossing a border simply as
100(1 − eγ2) (3)
with e denoting Euler’s constant. Moreover, we can use the expression 
in (2) to state the effect of crossing a border in terms of its distance-
equivalent simply as distequ = eγ2border/γ1 . 
We use two specifi cations for our dependent variable. In one ver-
sion, we treat each patent the same and simply add the number of pat-
ent transfers between two cities over some period of time. In a second 
specifi cation we exploit the fee structure to value each patent assign-
ment assuming that the patentees’ willingness to pay high fees refl ects 
the market value of patents. In this case, we weight each assigned pat-
ent by the cumulated fees that the patentee had to pay between year of 
issue and year of assignment. In each specifi cation, we control for un-
observed region-specifi c effects, distinguishing between cases where a 
region enters as a buyer and cases where it enters as a seller. This ap-
proach will pick up basic differences in economic and innovative activ-
ity, but also variation in price levels or differences in multilateral resis-
tance between regions that would affect our estimate of trade barriers, 
i.e., distance and border effects. Given the special position of Berlin, we
add an extra control whenever the German Empire enters the sample.
We also show that including a separate control for the average value of
transferred patents mainly improves the fi t of the model, but has little
effect on the coeffi cients of interest unless we add interaction effects.
Moreover, we control for the average year of issue for all pairwise pat-
ent assignments and cluster standard errors around the year of issue to
allow for heterogeneity around the year of issue. This method should
control for possible censoring effects mentioned earlier but also for
variation in the sample that is time-specifi c but not specifi c to any of the
city pairs and is not picked up by other variables.
What do we expect to fi nd? To start with, many of the region-
s pecifi c effects will be signifi cant with a negative or positive sign, pick-
ing up differences in innovative activity, industrial specialization, in-
come, and the like. Especially we expect to see a strong positive 
“Berlin” effect, given the extraordinary position of Berlin in Germany’s 
economy during the Kaiserreich. Next, we expect to fi nd that bilateral 
frictions matter in several ways. We expect to see a negative effect of 
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distance on the frequency of patent assignments, which should be small 
relative to the usual fi nding for commodity trade fl ows. As a benchmark, 
Anne-Célia Disdier and Keith Head report from a meta-analysis of stud-
ies using the gravity equation a distance coeffi cient of −0.9.44 We also 
expect to fi nd that borders limited the frequency of patent assignments, 
where national borders might exert a stronger infl uence compared to 
intranational borders. Finally, we expect to see that in general more 
valuable patents are more frequently assigned than less valuable pat-
ents, because for them any level of bilateral frictions would impose a 
relatively smaller barrier. 
Results and Discussion
We fi rst present results with the unweighted number of transfers 
between city pairs as dependent variable (Table 3, models 1–3).
To start with column 2 (Basic model), we fi nd a signifi cant negative 
effect of distance on the frequency of patent assignments. A doubling of 
distance implies, ceteris paribus, a reduction in the frequency of as-
signments by 8.9 percent. This is an order of magnitude smaller than 
the distance effects found in the literature on commodity trade fl ows. 
For comparison, Nikolaus Wolf estimates (statistically signifi cant) coef-
fi cients on distance between −1.3 and −1.6 for commodity trade fl ows 
in Germany, 1880–1913.45 While our result needs to be seen as a lower 
bound estimate, we think that this result is rather plausible. Distance 
mattered for patent assignments, but it mattered much less than for 
commodity trade. In addition, we fi nd that crossing a state border re-
duces that frequency by about 20 percent, and crossing the external 
border of Germany reduces it by about 24 percent.46 These border ef-
fects can also be expressed in terms of distance. Crossing a German state 
border has the same effect as increasing the distance between buyer 
and seller by about 13 kilometers.47 The impact of an international 
border equals about 22 kilometers.48 But again, the estimated coeffi -
cients are smaller than those estimated for commodity trade in the Kai-
serreich.49 We also fi nd—not surprisingly—that much of the transfer 
44 Anne-Célia Disdier and Keith Head, “The Puzzling Persistence of the Distance Effect on 
Bilateral Trade,” Review of Economics and Statistics 90, no. 1 (2008): 37–41. 
45 Wolf, “Was Germany Ever United?” 846–81.
46 Applying formula (3) we can calculate the effect of borders on trade as 100 * (1 − 
exp(−0.228) for state borders, and 100 * (1 − exp(−0.277) for external borders.
47 The distance equivalent of the state border effect can be calculated as exp (−0.228/ 
−0.089).
48 The distance equivalent of the external border effect can be calculated as exp (−0.277/ 
−0.089).
49 Wolf, “Was Germany Ever United?” Table 2.
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activity involves buyers or sellers in Berlin, refl ecting Berlin’s special 
position in the Kaiserreich. 
Next, in column 3, we include a control for the average value of pat-
ents as approximated by the fees that patentees had to incur between 
the issue and the assignment date of the patent. We fi nd that, indeed, 
more valuable patents are more often assigned. In the last column, we 
interact the value of assigned patents with distance and see that for 
more valuable patents distance poses less of a barrier. Highvalue is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the value of the patent is above the 
Table 3
The Effect of Distance and Borders on the Frequency of 











Log distance   −0.089 
  (−6.27)***
  −0.090 
(−6.45)***
  −0.119 
 (−7.69)***
Log distance × highvalue — —     0.058 
   (4.79)***
International border   −0.277 
(−3.86)***
  −0.271 
(−3.91)***
  −0.263 
(−3.99)***
German state border   −0.228 
(−3.52)***
  −0.225 
(−3.75)***
  −0.220 
(−3.72)***
Berlin Dummy     0.679 
   (8.74)***
    0.674 
   (9.28)***
    0.651 
   (9.28)***
Log mean year of issue  14.788 
   (1.01)***
   43.706 
   (3.51)***
   41.452 
   (3.40)***
Log mean value of patents —  0.259 
   (8.99)***
    0.142 
   (4.31)***
Seller effects Yes Yes Yes







Adjusted R 2     0.118  0.191  0.201
Root MSE     0.891    0.854  0.848
Number of observations (city pairs) 2,614 2,614  2,614
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Robust standard errors, clustered on mean year of issue.
*** Signifi cant at the 0.1% level.
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m edian in the sample. With this, we fi nd that the net effect of geograph-
ical distance for high valued patents is only about half the effect for the 
sample mean. 
In Table 4 we use the number of patent assignments between cities, 
valued with the cumulated fees payable between date of issue and as-
signment as dependent variable. This specifi cation is a bit closer to the 
standard framework used in gravity models. However, this has very lit-
tle effect on the estimated distance and border coeffi cients, whether we 
add again a control for the mean value of assigned patents at the right 
Table 4
The Effect of Distance and Borders on the Frequency of Patent 











Log distance   −0.088 
(−4.37)***
  −0.090 
(−6.45)***
  −0.119 
(−7.69)***
Log distance × highvalue — —     0.589 
   (4.79)***
International border   −0.303 
(−2.59)***
  −0.271 
(−3.91)***
  −0.263 
(−3.99)***
German state border   −0.240 
(−2.06)***
  −0.225 
(−3.75)***
  −0.220 
(−3.72)***
Berlin Dummy     0.701 
   (6.03)***
    0.674 
   (9.28)***
    0.651 
   (9.28)***
Log mean year of issue  −97.025 
(−3.85)***
   43.706 
   (3.51)***
   41.452 
   (3.40)***
Log mean value of patents —  1.259  
   (8.99)***
    1.142 
  (34.69)***
Seller effects Yes Yes Yes
Buyer effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant  735.091 





Adjusted R 2     0.110  0.714  0.717
Root MSE     1.507     0.854     0.848
Number of observations (city-pairs) 2,614  2,614  2,614
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Robust standard errors, clustered on mean year of issue.
*** Signifi cant at the 0.1% level.
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hand side (column 3) or not (column 2). Column 3 simply replicates the 
results from Table 2 with the modifi ed dependent variable. The most 
notable fi nding that we get for both specifi cations of the dependent 
variable is that distance and administrative borders mattered. Surpris-
ingly, not only the external border of the German Empire but also in-
ternal state borders (say between Bavaria and Prussia) did reduce the 
frequency of patent assignments. Given that we control for Berlin, this 
is not just an artifact of the high frequency of intra-Berlin assignments. 
Using the simple formula (3) from the previous section we can cal-
culate by how much the frequency of patent assignments is reduced 
compared to the sample mean once an administrative border is crossed. 
If we take the results from either Table 3 (column 3) or Table 4 (col-
umn 3) as a benchmark, we can calculate that crossing an internal bor-
der (e.g., between Bavaria and Prussia) reduced the frequency of as-
signments by about 20 percent. Instead, crossing the external border 
of the German Empire reduced the frequency of assignments by about 
24 percent. The difference between these two border effects is not sig-
nifi cant. Whenever both state and external borders had to be crossed, 
this reduced the frequency of assignments by an impressive 39 percent. 
These effects are substantially smaller than those reported by Nikolaus 
Wolf in 2009 for commodity trade in the Kaiserreich based on a sample 
of domestic and international trade fl ows, 1880–1913. Here, crossing 
an internal state border reduced commodity trade by 37 percent; cross-
ing the external border reduced trade by 69 percent. Still, our estima-
tion results—and another look at Table 1—suggest that these effects are 
not only statistically but also economically signifi cant. Hence, not only 
the market for commodities such as rye or manufactured products con-
tinued to be fragmented before 1914, but also the market for innova-
tions was far from integrated. 
Finally, we explore whether the effect of distance and borders 
changed over time. Given that the German Empire was still a young 
state, we might expect that it took time to create a common market for 
goods and also for technologies. The year 1900 lends itself as a suitable 
breakpoint, because it is roughly in the middle of our sample and due to 
the nationwide introduction of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), 
which provided a unifi ed regulation of contracts, including contracts on 
the transfer of patents. Table 5 shows how the effect of distance and 
borders changed after 1900. 
We see that the distance effect tends to increase over time, while 
the effect of borders remains largely unchanged. Again using our for-
mula (3) from the previous section, we can calculate by how much the 
frequency of patent assignments is reduced compared to the sample 
mean once an administrative border is crossed before and after 1900. 
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According to the results in columns 2 and 3 (unbalanced sample), cross-
ing an internal border reduced the frequency of patent assignments by 
about 19 percent before 1900 and by 23 percent thereafter. Interest-
ingly, we fi nd a much stronger increase in the effect of crossing an in-
ternational border (from 16 percent before 1900 to 27 percent there-
after). If we take into account that the effect of distance increased, we 
fi nd that the effect of internal borders as a share of trade frictions within 
the Kaiserreich declined after 1900. This result is what we would have 
expected from the unifi cation of private law with the introduction of 
the BGB. 
However, the fact that the set of city pairs that traded patents during 
the fi rst and the second period changed complicates the interpretation 
Table 5
The Effect of Distance and Borders on the Frequency of 
Patent Assignments (weighted by patent value) before and 










Log distance   −0.066 
(−3.68)***
  −0.088 
(−5.60)***
  −0.085 
  (−2.20)**
   −0.090 
  (−1.91)*
International border   −0.179 
(−1.97)*
  −0.314 
(−4.18)***
  −0.348 
  (−1.41)
   −0.214 
  (−0.89)
German state border   −0.216 
(−2.55)***
  −0.264 
(−4.17)***
  −0.408 
  (−2.51)**
   −0.548 
  (−2.91)***
Berlin dummy  0.303 
   (3.25)***
 0.682 
   (7.93)***
    0.358 
   (2.50)**
     0.556 
    (3.05)***
Log mean year of issue  16.298 
   (0.66)
 60.227 
   (2.30)**
   42.667 
   (1.11)
   159.213 
    (2.71)***
Log mean value of patents  0.200 
   (5.12)***
 0.271 
   (7.92)***
    0.319 
   (4.67)***
     0.483 
    (6.72)***
Seller effects Yes Yes Yes Yes









Adjusted R 2  0.724     0.706  0.730  0.623
Root MSE     0.733  0.874  0.961      1.241
Number of observations
 (city pairs) 1,059 1,927 372 372
Source: Authors’ calculations. Robust standard errors, clustered on mean year of issue.
* Signifi cant at the 5% level; ** signifi cant at the 1% level; *** signifi cant at the 0.1% level.
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of these results. Among the 1,059 pairs that traded before 1900 and the 
1,927 that traded after 1900, only 372 pairs actually traded in both peri-
ods. If we restrict our attention to this “balanced” sample, we fi nd that 
there was indeed a slight increase in the effect of distance-related fric-
tions and some increase in the effect of intra-German borders, while 
the estimated coeffi cients on the international border are not signifi -
cant. All these results need to be interpreted with great caution, as they 
are based on only a handful of observations (those for which we have 
data on both periods and where the international border was crossed). 
Note also that our sample contains only realized patent assignments 
but not those that were prevented by prohibitively high barriers to 
trade. Hence, our estimates of distance and border effects must be con-
sidered as lower bounds for the true obstacles to trade in innovation. 
Conclusion
In 1914, Germany had been politically united for more than four 
decades. Nonetheless, markets for technology were not fully integrated. 
This is one major—and perhaps surprising—fi nding of this article. Using 
patent assignment data for the period 1884 to 1913 and a standard re-
gression approach from the international trade literature—the gravity 
equation—we fi nd that the geographic distance between assignor and 
assignee negatively affected the likelihood of patent assignments. Be-
yond distance, administrative borders within Germany as well as Ger-
many’s international borders negatively affected the probability of pat-
ent assignments. This fi nding is perhaps not surprising with respect to 
international patent transfers—foreigners perhaps did not know the de-
tails of German patent law, or they did not speak German—but it seems 
to be surprising with respect to the internal borders. The effect of the 
border between, say, Prussia and Saxony was nearly as large as the bor-
der between Prussia and France. Prussia and Saxony shared the same 
language and the same patent law—but they were not fully integrated 
with respect to technology transfers. This mirrors similar fi ndings for 
commodity market integration in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-
century Germany as well as comparable results for the modern Ameri-
can patent market. Even in the modern United States, knowledge spill-
overs are partially detained by state borders.
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